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Inherited Excess Mortgage Property:
Death and the Inherited Tax Shelter
LOUIS A. DEL COTTO AND KENNETH F. JOYCE *
Introduction
This article is concerned with the federal tax effect of a decedent dying
holding property which is subject to a mortgage in excess of its adjusted
basis. The enactment of the carryover basis provisions of section 1023
and the related provisions of section 1040 as part of the 1976 Tax Re-
form Act 1 has caused speculation on whether gain will be recognized
to the decedent, or to his estate, or to the ultimate beneficiary of the
property, in the amount of the difference between basis and liability.2 It
is our position that this speculation somewhat misconstrues the function
of section 1023. More specifically, we will attempt to demonstrate that
the underlying issues which arise at the death of an owner of mortgaged
property are basically the same as they were before section 1023 was en-
acted and are, for the most part, governed by settled principles.
Our basic position can be stated:
(1) The underlying principle is that transfers effected at death
should not be taxed any differently so far as the decedent-transferor is
concerned than are inter vivos transfers. Any gain or loss recognized
on a transfer at death should be reported on the decedent's final return.
(2) In determining whether a decedent has recognized gain or loss
at death, the debts of the decedent and encumbrances on his property
should be considered amounts realized, but an offset against those
amounts realized should be allowed, not only for the decedent's basis
in encumbered property, but also for his basis in other assets which
pass at death.
(3) If a decedent does not recognize gain at death, the question
• Louis A. DEL COTTO and KENNETH F. JOYCE are Professors of Law, Faculty
of Law and Jurisprudence, State University of New York at Buffalo.
IPub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
2 See New York County Lawyers' Association, Committee on Taxation, Excess
Mortgaged Property,-Caveat Venditor: A Report on Some of the Consequences
of the Carryover Basis Rules on Inherited Excess Basis Mortgaged Property, 33
TAx L. REv. 139 (1977) (herein cited as Lawyers Association); Silverstein, Sec-
tion 1023 Carryover Basis: Planning Problems and Opportunities, 19 BosToN
COLLEGE L. REV. 467, 502-05 (1978).
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whether the decedent's estate or a beneficiary will be taxed depends
largely upon the basis at death provisions. If the basis at death is a
combination of cost under section 1012 (for encumbrances on the
decedent's property) together with carryover from the decedent, then
some transferee from the decedent (estate or beneficiary) will ulti-
mately pay the tax on any gain inherent in the decedent's property.
If, on the other hand, the basis at death is stepped up under section
1014 (or the partial step-up provisions of section 1023) then the
step-up wipes out the potential gain in the decedent's property pro
tanto, so that it may completely avoid the income tax.
The overall problem of the transfer of mortgaged property at death is
better seen if it is restated as a number of different problems, depending
on such variations as whether the decedent consumed the mortgage
benefits during his life, whether the property is the subject of a specific
or residuary bequest or whether the beneficiary of the mortgaged prop-
erty acquires additional property from the decedent. Before we discuss
these variations, however, we will summarize our basic position on the
underlying issues.
Basic Theory: Essential Identity of Lifetime Transfers
and Transfers at Death
Established Law: Rules for Lifetime Transfers
Under Crane v. Commissioner,, the settled general principle is that
the conveyance of encumbered property is a sale, and the encumbrance
is included in the transferor's amount realized under section 1001. This
principle has been extended to the part sale-part gift situation by a num-
ber of cases and rulings, including Joseph W. Johnson,4 which held that
3 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
459 T.C. 791 (1973), aft'd, 495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1040 (1974). See also Rev. Rul. 75-194, 1975-1 C.B. 80. The authorities are
discussed in Del Cotto, Sales and Other Dispositions of Property Under Section
1001: The Taxable Event, Amount Realized and Related Problems of Basis, 26
BUFFALO L. REV. 219, 299-305 (1977) (herein cited as Del Cotto).
Compare with Crane and Johnson, Blumenthal v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d
507 (2d Cir.), rev'd per curiam, 296 U.S. 552 (1935), reinstating 30 B.T.A. 591
(1934), suggesting that transferor's personal liability for the encumbrance pre-
vents a sale unless the transferee assumes the debt. This result is contrary to what
appears to be the better reasoned position of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
(the transferor lost primary liability for the debt, becoming only a surety) which
was reversed by the Court on the authority of Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1
(1935). For a discussion of Blumenthal, see Comment, Tax Consequences of
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there was a taxable sale to the extent of the encumbrance and only the
equity (i.e., the excess of the value of the property over the encum-
brance) was transferred by gift. One of the purposes of this principle of
Crane is to recapture as gain from the sale the amount of past deprecia-
tion deductions which were taken because of inclusion of the mortgage
debt in the basis for depreciation, but which were not supported by true
economic cost. Unless the past depreciation is so recaptured, the con-
veyance of the property will shift the liability from the transferor to the
transferee, and the transferor would never pay either the economic or tax
cost of the benefit he received from past depreciation deductions. The
second purpose of the recapture principle is similar. It taxes as gain any
past borrowing on the appreciation in the property. This gain does not
represent past depreciation so it will not be taxed because of prior de-
ductions; it does, however, represent previously borrowed, and untaxed,
dollars which will not be repaid by the transferor after conveyance of the
property. The tax on the gain represents a delayed tax on this past
borrowing.'
The effect of the Crane-Johnson rule is to create a deferred tax on
past gain attributable either to tax-saving deductions without economic
cost, or to tax-free borrowing on the value of property. Both types of
tax benefit are given on condition that the owner of the property even-
tually pays the related debt. When the property is transferred subject to
the debt and it becomes clear that the transferor will not pay it, he must
account for his past gain.' It should be emphasized at this point that this
does not involve the taxation of unrealized appreciation, but rather the
deferred taxation (i.e., recognition) of clearly realized gain (i.e., past
rents or other income previously offset by depreciation deductions, or
loan proceeds of a now effectively extinguished debt).
Before analyzing the operation of this rule on death transfers, let us
illustrate how it operates for a lifetime transfer. Assume T owns Black-
acre which has a value of $100,000, is encumbered by a mortgage of
$80,000 due to T's having borrowed $80,000 on the appreciation in the
property and that T's basis in Blackacre is $10,000. On a lifetime trans-
fer by "gift," T would be taxed on $70,000 of gain because Johnson
would treat the transfer as a part sale for $80,000 and a part gift of
$20,000. The regulations do not use an allocated basis approach in
Funding Trusts With Encumbered Property: The Demise of Section 677, 28 FLA.
L. REv. 708, 713-15 (1976).
5 For a discussion of the two purposes, see Del Cotto at 294-98.
6 Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt, and the Crane Case, 33 TAx L REV.
277, 284 (1978); Del Cotto, Basis and Amount Realized under Crane: A Cur-
rent View of Some Tax Effects in Mortgage Financing, 118 U. PA. L REv. 69,
85-86 (1969).
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computing the gain from the part sale,' and so the amount realized,
$80,000, is offset by the full $10,000 basis. Johnson also allowed full
basis rather than allocated basis offset.8
The tax on the $70,000 gain is said to be upon the gain from the sale;
as noted above, it is really a deferred tax on the gain from the past bor-
rowing, the benefit of which the transferor retains while shifting the
liability to the transferee. The result to the transferor would be identical,
and the reasoning would be similar, if the mortgage represented the cost
of the property I and T had taken $70,000 of depreciation deductions.10
Turning to the transferee, his basis under the regulations is the higher of
his cost (the amount of the mortgage) or the carryover basis from the
transferor," here, $80,000. This result is in accord with sections 1012
and 1015 applied independently: The transferee has a cost of $80,000,
and a carryover basis of zero, because the transferor fully utilized his
basis on the part sale.'
2
This example illustrates two basic ideas: (1) A transfer of property
by gift is not a taxable event to the transferor,1 3 and so, the $20,000 of
equity value is not taxed as gain. (2) No matter that the label "gift"
is placed on the entire transaction, there is a sale up to the amount of
the mortgage, and there is a gift only to the extent of the equity, that
is, to the extent the value of the property exceeds the mortgage. Thus,
the amount of the mortgage is an amount realized to the transferor
under section 1001, and is cost to the transferee under section 1012.
The carryover basis provisions of section 1015 apply only to the
equity.
This last statement, which is crucial to our later analysis of death
transfers, deserves elaboration. Suppose there were no equity in the prop-
erty. Suppose, for example, the property had a fair market value of
$80,000, the mortgage still being $80,000 and the transferor's basis
still being $10,000. In such a case, any transfer, even an intrafamily
transfer in a gift setting, would not involve a gift for tax purposes, to any
extent, because there was no equity. Nothing of economic value passed
gratuitously to the transferee. Such an intrafamily transfer would be
7 Reg. § 1.1001-1(e), discussed in Del Cotto at 301-05.
8 495 F.2d at 1084-85.
9 The mortgage is allowed as basis under another aspect of Crane. Del Cotto
at 294-98.
10 See, e.g., Teofilo Evangelista, 71 T.C. 1057 (1979).
11 Reg. § 1.1015-4(a). Some part of the gift tax is also added to basis under
section 1015(d) and this regulation, but that addition will be ignored since it is
not pertinent to our discussion.
12 Del Cotto at 301-05.
13 See, e.g., Grove v. Comm'r, 490 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1973). See generally
Del Cotto at 299.
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identical with a sale in a commercial setting, or an abandonment to the
mortgagee, or a "contribution" to charity. In all cases, since the entire
value of the property was subject to the lien, the transferee's basis would
be a cost basis under section 1012. Notions of carryover basis under
section 1015 would be completely irrelevant.
Applicability of Principles of Lifetime
Transfers to Transfers at Death
Let us now turn to the case of a taxpayer who dies owning the prop-
erty described in our principal example: property which is worth $100,-
000, subject to a mortgage of $80,000 and in which he has a basis of
$10,000. For purposes of this discussion of basic theory, we will assume
that the decedent has no other property in his estate (probate or non-
probate), that his will leaves all of his estate to one beneficiary and that
the title to the mortgaged property passes directly and immediately to
the beneficiary on the decedent's death. Variations on these assump-
tions will be discussed in detail later.
First, we know that the transfer of property by bequest, devise or in-
heritance is not a taxable event to the decedent; "I nor is its receipt tax-
able to the estate.15 But, just as in the case of property passing by gift
in a lifetime transfer, the only portion of the property passing by "be-
quest, devise or inheritance" at death is the equity value of $20,000,
because, no matter that a label like "inheritance" is placed on the entire
transaction, up to the amount of the mortgage there is a sale, and the
amount of the mortgage should therefore be an amount realized to the
decedent who received the fruits of the mortgage. Only in this manner
can anyone be made to account for the benefit the decedent received
during his life from the borrowing. The beneficiary will not (and should
not) account for such benefit because, by a parity of reasoning, the
amount of the mortgage is included as cost basis to the beneficiary since
to the extent of the mortgage the acquisition is by purchase rather than
by inheritance."0 Thus, the decedent would recognize $70,000 of gain at
death and the beneficiary's basis would include the $80,000 mortgage.
(The beneficiary's basis in the equity of $20,000 would depend on
whether section 1014 or the carryover basis provisions of section 1023
applied.)
It has been suggested that these results are precluded because Con-
14 Rev. Rul. 73-183, 1973-1 C.B. 364.
15 I.R.C. § 102.
16 Crane contains the contrary implication that all of the property was acquired
by inheritance. For a discussion of this point, see Del Cotto at 294-95.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
19791
574 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:
gress, by enacting the carryover basis provisions of section 1023, de-
cided against recognition of gain at death. 17 The suggestion appears to
be that the presence of carryover basis for the transferee indicates a con-
gressional intent not to tax the decedent-transferor. This, of course, is
the law for lifetime gifts of unencumbered property: The transferor does
not recognize any appreciation in the property as gain; the transferee
steps into the transferor's basis shoes by way of section 1015(a), and
could eventually recognize the gain which was not taxed to the trans-
feror. This, basically, is also the law for transfers at death of unencum-
bered property where section 1023 applies. This is not the law, how-
ever, for lifetime gifts of encumbered property because Crane and
Johnson view the transferor as receiving consideration in the form of
relief from the debt, i.e., as selling the property for the debt; and, to the
extent of the debt, the transferee is viewed as acquiring not by gift (with
a carryover basis), but by purchase (with a cost basis). Indeed, a cor-
nerstone of the Crane rationale is that for the purposes of basis, the
transferee must be treated in advance as if he paidthe mortgage debt. 8
Thus, the transferee is entitled to a cost basis and is prevented from being
in the (carryover) basis shoes of the transferor and, since the trans-
feree will not be taxed on the transferor's gain due to lack of a carryover
basis, the transferor should be taxed, and is under Crane and Johnson.
Otherwise, the gain will escape tax altogether.
So it is for lifetime transfers; so it should be for transfers at death.
Whether the basis provision governing property acquired by bequest,
devise or inheritance is section 1023 or section 1014, to the extent the
transferee gets a cost basis for debt encumbering the transferred prop-
erty, the basis will be determined under section 1012, and section 1023
or section 1014 will only apply to the equity. Hence, the tax conse-
17Lawyers Association at 152-58, 165-66; Jacobowitz, Carryover Basis and
the Inherited Tax Shelter, 116 TRUSTS & ESTATES 799, 801 (1977) (herein cited
as Jacobowitz); Roth, Transfer at Death of Property Subject to An Indebtedness
In Excess of the Decedent's Basis: A Problem With the New Carryover Basis, 58
BOSTON U.L. REV. 765, 782 (1978) (herein cited as Roth).
18 The reason for giving advance credit to the transferee of mortgaged property
is the unacceptability of the alternative, which would be to await actual payment
before giving the transferee a cost basis. Such an alternative would, with respect
to depreciable property, distort depreciation deductions by requiring a continual
readjustment of basis, and, even more important, with respect to both depreciable
and nondepreciable property, it would be inconsistent with the accepted rule that
the proceeds of a typical loan transaction do not constitute income, it being pre-
sumed that the borrower will repay the loan. In this respect, from the point of
view of a transferee, there is no economic difference between taking subject to
an existing mortgage and obtaining a cost basis by discharging an existing mort-
gage with borrowed money. This is true, moreover, regardless of whether the
transferee acquires by a lifetime transfer or a transfer at death.
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quences for the decedent should be the same whether the basis provision
governing the transferee's equity is section 1014 or section 1023.
It is true that prior to the enactment of section 1023 it was generally
assumed that a transfer at death was not a taxable sale or disposition
even where the liabilities exceeded the basis of property transferred.1"
The result of such an assumption in a case such as our hypothetical
(but, as we will see, not in all cases) was that $70,000 of gain, deferred
in the hands of the decedent, completely escaped taxation. Perhaps this
result was tolerated in view of section 1014 which permitted unrealized
gain to escape taxation. It has been suggested, "0 in fact, that Congress-
by failing to enact proposals of the Treasury in 1963 .1 and in 1969 -2
to undo section 1014 by taxing appreciation at death-has rejected al-
together the notion of death as a taxable event for income tax purposes.
As we have pointed out, however, the question we are dealing with does
not involve the taxation of unrealized gain, but rather the deferred taxa-
tion of realized gain. -3 Since the Treasury's proposals to repeal section
1014 were directed at taxing unrealized appreciation at death, the fact
that Congress balked at so general a levy should not be interpreted as
congressional disapproval of a tax upon a much more limited category
of transactions involving gain realized by a decedent during his life."'
Moreover, after the enactment of the carryover basis provisions of sec-
tion 1023 in 1976, there is no longer any wholesale escape of unrealized
appreciation at a decedents death. There is thus no longer even this
specious argument for allowing the deferred tax on realized gain to re-
sult in complete escape at the decedent's death.
Again, the point that is critical to understand is that when mortgaged
property is transferred at death, the transferee is as much entitled as a
lifetime transferee to a cost basis to the extent of the mortgage. The trans-
feree at death and the lifetime transferee are in identical economic posi-
tions vis-h-vis the mortgaged property. In terms of our hypothetical
case, each has received property worth $100,000, subject to a mort-
19 Silverstein, Section 1023 Carryover Basis: Planning Problems and Oppor-
tunities, 19 BOSTON COLLEGE L. REv. 467, 503 (1978). But see Jacobowitz at
800-01.
20 Roth at 782.
21 Hearings on H.R. 8363 Before the House Connittee on Ways and Means,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 52-56 (1963) (President's 1963 Tax Message).
2 2 HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON FI-
NANCE, 91ST CONG., 1ST SEss., TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS, U.S. TREA-
SURY DEPARTMENT, Part 3, at 334 (Comm. Print 1969).
23 Del Cotto, Basis and Amount Realized under Crane: A Current View of
Some Tax Effects in Mortgage Financing, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 69, 93-95 (1969).
24 Berning, Income Tax Events Triggered by Death-A n Examination of Se-
lected Problems, 56 TAXES 775, 785-86 (1978).
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gage of $80,000, and has thus gratuitously received an equity of
$20,000. The factors which have led the courts and the Treasury to give
the transferee advance credit for payment of the mortgage debt apply
without differentiation to the transferee at death as well as to the life-
time transferee. They are, in fact, the same factors which apply when
there is no gratuitous transfer of the equity, either because there is no
equity or separate consideration has been given by the transferee for the
equity (for instance, a down payment).
And if, as we contend, the transferee at death must be given this cost
basis as advance credit for the payment of the mortgage, in a case like
the one in our example, the conclusion is inescapable that if the gain is
not recognized at death it will escape recognition altogether. Such an
escape would truly violate the purpose for the enactment of section 1023
and would render transfers at death more advantageous than lifetime
transfers-the very phenomenon section 1023 was designed to elimi-
nate.2 5
To reiterate, our basic position is twofold:
(1) The provisions for basis of property acquired from a decedent,
sections 1014 and 1023, do not speak to, or in any way affect, the
income tax consequences to a decedent who dies with excess mort-
gaged property. These income tax consequences are the same as those
upon a transfer of property during life, and are governed by the rules
of Crane and Johnson.
(2) Sections 1014 and 1023 have no application to the transferee
25 The belief has been expressed that "Congress' failure to treat excess mort-
gaged property differently from other types of appreciated property can[not] be
attributed to mere oversight. The House... Report... describes the application
of section 1023 to property subject to a non-recourse mortgage of $80,000, having
a basis of only $10,000, a classic example of excess mortgaged property." Lawyers
Association at 165-66 n.86. The example discussed in the House report, however,
merely illustrates what section 1023(g) (4) was intended to provide, i.e., that to
the extent of the mortgage the property does not bear any estate taxes and there-
fore should not share in any estate tax adjustments. H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 39-40 (1976). The example does not speak to the question of
whether the decedent is required to recognize any gain at death or whether the
basis of the transferee includes the amount of the mortgage. The $10,000 basis
referred to in the example discussed in the report is not the basis of the estate or
other transferee, but is rather the basis used to determine "net appreciation" which
is defined in section 1023(f) (2) as "the amount by which the fair market value
of such property exceeds the adjusted basis of such property immediately before
the death of the decedent." In short, nothing in the discussion of this example
in the House report is inconsistent with the notion that the decedent would be re-
quired to recognize gain at death, and more importantly, that the basis of the
transferee includes the amount of the mortgage under section 1012. Section 1023
(g) (4) which is the source of the House report's example, has since been repealed.
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of the property, whether it is the decedent's estate or the ultimate
beneficiary, to the extent such transferee takes subject to the mort-
gage. To this extent, the transferee acquires by purchase and not by
bequest, devise or inheritance, and thus takes a cost basis in the
amount of the mortgage under section 1012.
All of this is not to say, however, that a decedent who dies owning
property mortgaged in excess of basis should recognize gain to the ex-
tent of such excess, or to any extent. As we trust our prior discussion
has demonstrated, the death of the decedent is the appropriate time to
treat him as recapturing the mortgage amount as an amount realized
under section 1001. As the following discussion will demonstrate,
whether the decedent recognizes any gain at death will depend upon the
amount of offsetting basis he may have in both the mortgaged property
and in assets other than the mortgaged property. This discussion will
show that gain can be recognized by the decedent, or, where section
1023 is in effect, by the decedent's beneficiaries and, in some situations,
by the decedent's estate. Finally, we shall see that a significant role can
be played by the decedent's will and other estate planning instruments,




Assume that A owns Blackacre, which has a fair market value of
$100,000 and a basis to A of, for the sake of simplicity, zero.
Example 1: A makes a gift of Blackacre to B. The accepted tax re-
sults of this transaction are:
(1) No gain is recognized to A.
(2) B's basis is zero, the carryover basis under section 1015(a), dis-
regarding the gift tax adjustments of section 1015(d). Thus, when B
sells the property, he will recognize the gain attributable to the apprecia-
tion in the hands of A, together with any appreciation taking place
thereafter.
Example 2: Prior to the transfer to B, A borrows $80,000 with per-
sonal liability, giving no mortgage. A gives Blackacre to B and keeps
the $80,000. The tax results are the same as for Example 1. A's bor-
rowing has no effect on A's basis in Blackacre, which remains at zero;
nor does A's borrowing affect B's basis since A's debt does not become
attached to Blackacre; thus, it does not become a liability of B. With
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
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respect to Blackacre, B's basis is a carryover basis and he stands in the
shoes of A.
Example 3: On borrowing the $80,000, A gives back a mortgage on
Blackacre and then transfers Blackacre to B subject to the mortgage,
A keeping the $80,000. This is the Johnson situation (part sale for
$80,000 and part gift of $20,000) and the tax results are:
(1) A's amount realized is $80,000 (the amount of the mortgage);
his basis offset is zero and his gain is $80,000.
(2) B's basis is $80,000 (cost under section 1012)
0 (under section 1015 (a))
$80,000 (total).
These tax results view A as selling the property for the amount of the
mortgage in order to make him account for his past tax-free borrowing
of $80,000 on the value of Blackacre, the benefit of which he will keep
while shifting the liability to B. Thus, it is a deferred tax on a past eco-
nomic benefit. B will not receive a carryover basis of zero, but a cost
basis of $80,000 due to the presence of the mortgage on Blackacre,
which it is assumed B will pay.26 A is treated as being relieved from the
debt and pays the deferred tax on his past borrowing; B is given an
advance cost basis of $80,000 and will not pay tax on A's gain when he
sells Blackacre.2
7
Example 4: The facts are the same as in example 3, except that A
transfers to B both Blackacre (mortgaged by $80,000) and the $80,000
proceeds of the borrowing.28 This is an uncommon transaction to take
26 Del Cotto at 294-98. Compare Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt, and
the Crane Case, 33 TAx L. REv. 277 (1978).
27 B's basis would also include the step up for the gift tax paid, i.e., the portion
of the gift tax allocable to the appreciation in value of the gift. The value of the
gift here is $20,000 and no basis should be allocated to it because A used all the
basis on the sale. So the entire gift tax is allocable to appreciation in value. See
I.R.C. § 1015(d) (6); Del Cotto at 317 n.487.
28 We assume here that the $80,000 is in the form of cash and thus clearly has
a basis of $80,000. Any other property with an $80,000 basis would serve the same
function as the cash in this example. It does not matter that the value of the prop-
erty is less than its basis if any inherent loss in the property is deductible upon
realization. For example, if A bought Whiteacre with the $80,000 cash and the
value of Whiteacre fell to $70,000, the mortgage could be paid off with Whliteacre
to the extent of $70,000, and the remaining $10,000 of gain from the mortgage
would be offset by the $10,000 loss in the sale of Whiteacre. Of course, if the
$10,000 loss is nondeductible, then $10,000 of basis in Whiteacre should be dis-
regarded. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974-2 C.B. 26.
The different consequences which would arise if the $80,000 was comprised of
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
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place during A's lifetime. It is quite common, however, for such a
transfer to take place at A's death. Therefore, we deal with it first as a
lifetime transfer to see how it is treated under established principles.
The factor differentiating this example from example 3 is that, while
A has shifted the mortgage liability to B by transferring Blackacre sub-
ject to the mortgage, A has also transferred to B the "fruits" of the mort-
gage, the borrowed proceeds of $80,000. Unlike Crane and Johnson,
where the transferor kept the fruits while shifting the liability, here A
has not kept any mortgage related benefits such as cash throw-off from
depreciation, or borrowed dollars. Therefore, A has no gain arising
from the transaction, because he has passed to B both the liability of
$80,000 plus the benefits relating to the liability, the borrowed pro-
ceeds of $80,000. There is no tax benefit to A upon which a deferred
tax should be imposed.
Who then will account for A's past tax-free borrowing? Under these
facts the logical candidate is B, who stands with respect to Blackacre,
the mortgage and the $80,000 of borrowed funds, exactly as did A, that
is, B stands squarely in the shoes of A with respect both to the mortgage
and the mortgage proceeds. Arguably, therefore, B should also stand
in A's income tax shoes and have a zero basis in Blackacre and a basis
of $80,000 in the borrowed cash. Now it is B who must repay the bor-
rowing or treat the mortgage as an amount realized on the disposition
of Blackacre.-
This is exactly the result we contend for, and the mechanism used to
arrive at the result is the accepted approach of Crane and Johnson. A
has transferred $100,000 of overall value by gift (S80,000 cash and
$20,000 equity in Blackacre) and has sold $80,000 by B assuming or
taking subject to the mortgage on Blackacre.
A's amount realized $80,000 (mortgage)
A's basis offset $80,000 (cash)
A's gain 0
B's basis is $80,000, cost under section 1012 and zero carryover
under section 1015(a), since A has used up his entire basis in the sale
portion of the transaction.3" B's basis of $80,000 is allocated among
property with less than $80,000 of basis in A's hands will be discussed in the
analysis of transfers at death.
29 Economically, the transaction is also the same as A transferring Blackacre to
B unencumbered, prior to any borrowing, and B himself borrowing the SS0,000
and giving the mortgage. In that case, B would clearly have a carryover basis of
zero under section 1015(a), and the mortgage would be his amount realized on
any disposition of Blackacre while it was encumbered.
3 0 Reg. § 1.1001-1(e), discussed in Del Cotto at 301-05.
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the assets received, Blackacre and the $80,000 cash. Since in this ex-
ample the cash must have a full basis, the entire $80,000 is allocated to
the money,3 and B has a zero basis in Blackacre.1
2
This is not the traditional part sale-part gift, but we see no reason
why it should not be viewed in the same way as if Blackacre had a value
of $180,000 and was subject to a mortgage of $80,000 and had a basis
of $80,000 to A. Under Johnson, a transfer of Blackacre would be a
part sale for $80,000 with a basis offset of $80,000, and a part gift of
$100,000. In our example there is also a transfer of a total value of
$180,000, having an overall basis of $80,000 and subject to a mortgage
of $80,000. A should have gain only to the extent that the amount of
the mortgage exceeds the total adjusted basis of all properties trans-
ferred.8 3
As an economic matter, the transaction could also be viewed as a no
sale-all gift transfer of an unencumbered Blackacre with no additional
cash. Stated another way, this transaction is economically the same as
if A paid off the mortgage with the $80,000 of cash and then transferred
Blackacre unencumbered to B, who thereafter proceeded himself to
borrow $80,000 giving back a mortgage on the property. If the trans-
action were recast in the form of these additional steps which lead to the
same economic result the tax consequences to both A and B would be
clear: A would have no gain, B's basis in Blackacre would be a carry-
over of zero from A and, after B borrowed $80,000, his basis in Black-
3 1 See, e.g., Reg. §§ 1.334-1(c) (4) (viii), 1.334-2.
32 Therefore, on a sale by B of Blackacre, B will recognize the gain of $80,000
attributable to the mortgage proceeds. This may appear to contradict the result to
B for the lifetime transfer and for example 3, where we noted that because B
acquired a cost basis in the amount of the mortgage, it was necessary to tax A on
the disposition of Blackacre, or no one would be taxed. In example 4, we do not
tax A because of his basis offset (attributable to the cash), and we do tax B when
he sells Blackacre despite his acquisition of a cost basis of $80,000. This result is
entirely proper since the basis is allocated away from Blackacre, to the cash, thus,
B does get the benefit of his "cost" for Blackacre, albeit it is shifted to a different
asset.
To clarify this point, instead of cash, assume A transferred Whiteacre, value
$80,000, basis $80,000, and unencumbered. The results are the same for A; B
again has $80,000 of cost due to the mortgage on Blackacre; we could attribute
that entirely to Blackacre, leaving Whiteacre with a carryover basis of zero. Now
B would recognize the $80,000 gain on the sale of Whiteacre. Or, we could allo-
cate the $80,000 basis between Blackacre and Whiteacre according to their re-
spective values. Then the gain would be wholly recognized only when both assets
were sold. The point is that however B's cost for Blackacre is allocated, he does
receive the benefit of that cost in some asset. In our example, it is reflected in the
cash due to the necessity for the cash to have a full basis.
38 The statutory analog for this result is section 357(c); Reg. § 1.357-2(a).
Section 357(c) is merely an application of section 1001 (and section 61) in lim-
itation of the anti-Hendler and anti-Crane principle of section 357(a). In other
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acre would remain at zero and his basis in the borrowed cash would be
$80,000. These should also be the results if in one step A transfers to
B both the cash that he borrowed plus the encumbered property
4
Transfers at Death
Again, let us assume that A owns Blackacre which has a fair market
value of $100,000 and a basis to A of zero.
Example 5: A dies owning only Blackacre unencumbered. The tax
results on the transfer of Blackacre at A's death are:
(1) No gain is recognized to A or to A's transferee."
(2) The basis of A's transferee in Blackacre will be $100,000 under
section 1014, or zero under section 1023 (disregarding adjustments).",
words, section 357(a) is the exception to the Crane-Hendler rule that the amount
realized on transfer of encumbered property is treated as the receipt of so much
cash. Section 357(c) reinstates that rule for encumbrances in excess of aggregated
basis.
34 This approach also eliminates problems in computing the step-up in basis in
Blackacre for any gift tax paid by A. Under section 1015(d) (6), B is entitled to
a step up for the gift tax paid which is attributable to the net appreciation in value
of the gift, i.e., the excess of the value of the gift, here, $100,000 over the trans-
feror's allocable basis immediately before the gift. I.R.C. § 1015(d) (6) (B).
Viewing all the property as a single unit, value $180,000, basis S80,000, the gift
portion of $100,000 could be argued to have an allocable basis of S45,000
(100/180 x $80,000), thus, a net appreciation in value of $55,000. But this statu-
tory formula fails to take into account that in a part gift-part sale transaction the
regulations and cases allocate the entire basis of S80,000 to the portion of the
property sold, and none to the gift portion of $100,000. Consistently, therefore,
the gift portion should have a basis of zero for the purpose of determining the net
appreciation under section 1015(d) (6) (B). Thus, the net appreciation would be
$100,000 and B would receive a step-up in basis for the entire gift tax paid. If,
for example, we assume that the gift tax paid by A was S10,000, then B would
have an overall basis of $90,000, allocable $80,000 to the cash and S10,000 to
Blackacre. This desired consistency would be achieved if, as we have stated in the
text, the one-step transaction where A transfers S80,000 of cash plus an encum-
bered Blackacre is seen as being the economic equivalent of, and therefore de-
manding the same tax consequences as, the multistep transaction where A first
pays off the mortgage with $80,000 of cash and then transfers an unencumbered
Blackacre to B who thereafter himself borrows $80,000 giving a mortgage on
Blackacre.
35 It is unnecessary at this point to discuss whether A's transferee is A's estate,
or some other ultimate beneficiary such as a beneficiary under A's will or an in-
testate distributee. All transferees would be entitled to exclude any gain as a
"bequest, devise or inheritance" under section 102(a).
36 Again, it is unnecessary at this point to identify the transferee of Blackacre
as being the estate or the ultimate testate or intestate beneficiary, because the con-
cept of "uniform basis" renders the basis the same in the hands of any transferee
who acquires property from a decedent under section 1014 or section 1023. Reg.
§ 1.1014-4(a). Any adjustments made under section 1023, such as for "fresh
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Example 6: Prior to his death, A borrows $80,000 and gives back a
mortgage on Blackacre. At his death, A's only assets and liabilities
consist of Blackacre, value of $100,000, encumbered by the $80,000
mortgage. The tax consequences at A's death should be similar to those
for example 3, where A deeded Blackacre to B during life and retained
the $80,000 mortgage proceeds. A's amount realized at the time of his
death is $80,000, the amount of the mortgage; his basis is zero, thus,
his gain recognized is $80,000.
The basis of the transferee 37 is
$ 80,000 (cost under section 1012)




0 (carryover under section 1023)
$ 80,000 (total).
This view of the tax consequences treats A at death exactly as Johnson
treats him when he makes the part sale-part gift transfer during life, as
in example 3. Once he is relieved of the debt by the transfer, there is a
sale in the amount of the debt and he must account for the $80,000 of
gain he consumed during his lifetime. There is thus imposed a deferred
tax on A's past economic benefit. The lifetime part sale-part gift trans-
lates to a part sale-part bequest and Crane and Johnson should apply
to A.
By a parity of reasoning, the transferee at death acquires a cost basis
of $80,000 by receiving advance credit for payment of the mortgage.
As previously discussed, there is no reason for the treatment of the
transferee at death to be different, with respect to the liability, from the
treatment of the lifetime transferee under Johnson. Although the Su-
preme Court, in interpreting the predecessor to section 1014, said in
Crane that the transferee's basis was the fair market value of the prop-
erty undiminished by the mortgage, the rest of the Court's reasoning
belies this conclusion and points to section 1012 as giving a cost basis for
start," or estate taxes paid, will eliminate part of the appreciation in Blackacre
and, to the extent of the adjustments, will have the same step-up effect as section
1014.
37 Again, there is no necessity at this point to identify the particular transferee
as being the estate of A, or the testamentary or intestate beneficiary of A, since
the basis effects of sections 1012, 1014 and 1023 will apply equally to any trans-
feree who takes subject to the mortgage and acquires the property by "bequest,
devise or inheritance."
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the mortgage.3s Later cases construing Crane support this conclusion."
Returning to A, why should we consider a transfer at death a taxable
event? And, assuming it is, why tax the decedent on his final return
rather than his estate or someone else, such as the ultimate beneficiary?
On the question of whether a transfer at death is a taxable event, we
are faced with what appears to be a general understanding of the law
prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, that the presence of a section 1014
step up prevented the decedent (and his transferee) from ever being
taxed on decedent's lifetime gain; there is also the belief that the enact-
ment of section 1023 may allow taxation of the gain to the transferee,
assuming its provisions will become effective in the future .4  Let us
just stress again our position that the presence of a basis at death pro-
vision, whether it be section 1014 or section 1023, affects the basis of
decedent's transferee only for the equity portion of the transfer, i.e., the
portion received by bequest, devise or inheritance; but such provisions
have no application to the encumbered portion of the transferred prop-
erty, either for the decedent or the transferee.
As for taxing the decedent on his final return, we contend he is a trans-
feror within Johnson, and that he (in his final return) is the one who must
account for the gain arising from the debt from which he is effectively
discharged on transfer of the property, since he is the one who realized
and benefitted from the gain during his life-his death being the only
occasion for a deferred tax on his lifetime gain.41 The presence of the
carryover basis provision of section 1023 is irrelevant because the trans-
feree will take the encumbrance as cost, and carryover basis applies
3 8 Del Cotto at 294-95.
39 Ibid. See also Del Cotto, Basis and Amount Realized under Crane: A Cur-
rent View of Sonze Tax Effects in Mortgage Financing, 118 U. PA. L REv. 69,
72-75 (1969). This result at death is specifically allowed by section 1.742-1 of
the regulations, which provides that the basis of a partnership interest acquired
from a decedent is its fair market value, increased by the estate's share of partner-
ship liabilities. Example 2 of section 1.743-1 (b) of the regulations makes it clear
that "net" fair market value is intended. The same analysis should apply to en-
cumbered property which is not a partnership interest.
40 See text accompanying Ns. 16-19 supra.
41 Compare Revenue Ruling 77-402, 1977-2 C.B. 222, where release of tax-
able powers in a grantor trust was held to be a sale by the grantor of the partner-
ship interest held by the trust, and his share of partnership liabilities was part of
his amount realized. The ruling states, "[wv]hen a transfer of an interest in a part-
nership occurs and the transferor's share of partnership liabilities is reduced or
eliminated, the transferor is treated as having sold the partnership interest for an
amount equal to the share of liabilities reduced or eliminated." See also Revenue
Ruling 75-194, 1975-1 C.B. 80, which describes the income tax consequences of
a transfer to a charity of a limited partnership interest. The limited partners' share
of the liabilities was an amount realized on a sale and only the equity value was
a gift. Accord, Rev. Rul. 70-626, 1970-2 C.B. 158.
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only to the equity in the property. Similarly, the section 1014 step up
does not apply to the decedent; nor should it apply to the full value of
the property in the hands of the transferee since payment of the mortgage
gives cost basis in that amount, with only the equity value being subject
to section 1014. Indeed, it is important again to stress this: Unless we
treat the mortgage as an amount realized in a taxable exchange at death,
no one will pay the tax on decedent's past gain of $80,000 because his
transferee will get a cost basis for the $80,000 mortgage.
It has been suggested that even if gain is recognized at the decedent's
death, it might be taxed to the estate as section 691 income in respect
of the decedent.4 2 Such a result would seem improper, however, since
it is the decedent who received and benefitted by the gain during his life,
in the form of either loan proceeds or other receipts offset by deprecia-
tion deductions. The estate, on the other hand, received no gain and
cannot be said to have benefitted from the mortgage.4" It bears repeat-
ing that the tax at the decedent's death would be a tax which would have
been imposed during the decedent's life if it were not for the presump-
tion that the mortgage would be repaid. If at the time of the mortgage
loan it had been known that the decedent would not repay the mortgage
42Roth at 782.
43 Compare the possible treatment of amounts received in payment for a de-
ceased partner's interest in the partnership. If the payments are attributable to
section 1245 or section 1250 gain, such gain may be recaptured as section 691
income. See I.R.C. §§ 691(e), 753, 751(c); Reg. § 1.736-1(a)(2). The com-
bined effect of these provisions is to lump depreciation recapture gain into the
category of "unrealized receivables" and possibly subject it to section 1014(c)
(no basis step up) and section 691 treatment. Also, section 1.742-1 of the regula-
tions specifically reduces any date of death basis by the decedent's share of part-
nership section 691 items. See generally Brode, Tax Shelter Problem Areas, 54
TAXES 306 (1976); Ginsburg, The Leaky Tax Shelter, 53 TAXES 719, 737-39
(1975) (herein cited as Ginsburg); FERGUSON, FREELAND & STEPHENS, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF ESTATES AND BENEFICIARIES 231-40 (1970). Receivables
owned by a decedent which arise from his performance of services or sale of goods
would clearly be subject to section 691 treatment at his death, so it is not surpris-
ing that the portion of a partnership interest attributable to such receivables of a
partnership receive a section 691 taint under the above provisions. Panel Discus-
sion, Handling the Problems of the Tax Shelter That Has Crossed the Line, 34
N.Y.U. INST. 397, 424-28 (1976), and authorities cited therein. The same treat-
ment for partnership recapture gain would be somewhat surprising in view of the
fact that recapture property of nonpartner decedents is eligible for basis step up
under section 1014, or upward basis adjustments under section 1023, because
neither section 1014(c) nor section 1023(b) (2) (A) invokes section 691 treat-
ment. I.R.C. §§ 1245(b) (2), 1250(d) (2); Reg. §§ 1.1245-2(c) (1) (iv), 1.1245-
4(b), 1.1250-3(b)(2). Indeed, in light of these regulations, it is arguable that
the partnership provisions on recapture property were intended to apply only to
lifetime transfers in order to prevent capital gain for such recapture on the dis-
position of a partnership interest, and were not intended to negative the general
rule for death transfers which allows the basis at death provisions of the Code to
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debt, there would be no reason to defer the tax on the loan and the
tax would be imposed on the loan proceeds despite a legal obligation to
repay.
4 4
An analogy from section 1033 may be helpful. Suppose a decedent
who has received the proceeds of an involuntary conversion determines
to replace the converted property but dies before actually purchasing
the replacement property. If the decedent's plan is carried out by his
executor within the permissible section 1033 period, no gain is recog-
nized.4 5 If the replacement does not take place within the permissible
period, however, the gain must be reported, and it must be reported on
the decedents return, since it is the decedent who realized the gain
during his life."0 So also in our case, the decedent is allowed (by virtue
of administrative and judicial decision) to exclude a receipt from income
on the supposition that the receipt will be repaid and that the receipt
apply. Horwitz, Depreciation Recapture-Partnership Transactions, BNA, TAX
MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO 289, at A-84 to A-90 (1973). But see Ginsburg at
738-39, who argues that basis at death provisions apply only if a section 754
election is in effect. Cf. FERGusoN, FREELAND & STEPHENS, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF ESTATES AND BENEFICIARIEs 227-34, 240-41 (1970).
The more important point to be made here is that any such recapture gain can
be taxed to the recipient under section 691 only if it is the gain of the recipient.
If the property is unencumbered and is sold for cash by the recipient, then he is
simply placed in decedent's shoes with respect to the gain. But if the property is
encumbered and the related proceeds flowing from the encumbrance are not re-
ceived by the transferee, as in our example 6, then it is decedent who consumed
the gain during his lifetime and his death should be a taxable event. Indeed, in
such a case, up to the amount of the mortgage there is simply no gain to the trans-
feree upon which he could be taxed. In that amount, he will receive nothing of
value which would be gain; and in any event he has a cost basis in that amount
were the mortgage to be treated as an amount realized to him, so he cannot be
taxed on decedent's gain. This conclusion that the decedent is taxed is supported
by the regulations on depreciation recapture which state that the section 1245
(b) (2) (and section 1250(d) (2)) exemption from recapture for "transfers at
death" does not apply where the transferee takes a cost basis under section 1012,
as distinguished from a date of death basis under section 1014 (or section 1023).
Reg. §§ 1.1245-4(b), 1.1250-3(b).
44 See, e.g., Fairchild v. Comm'r, 462 F.2d 462 (3d Cir. 1972).
45 In re Goodman's Estate, 199 F.2d 895 (3d Cir. 1952); Estate of Morris, 55
T.C. 636 (1971), aff'd per curiani, 454 F.2d 208 (4th Cir. 1972); Estate of
Gregg, 69 T.C. 468 (1977); Chichester v. United States, 78-1 U.S.T.C. € 9458
(D. Ala. 1978).
46 The return on which the gain must be reported is for the year during the
decedents life when the gain was realized, i.e., the year when the proceeds of the
conversion were received. Reg. § 1.1033(a)-2(c) (2). In our case, it would be
more accurate to open up the decedent's previous return or returns, but there is
no statutory authority for this, and without statutory authority an analogy to the
tax benefit cases supports the decedents final return as the proper one. Compare
Perry v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 270 (Ct. Cl. 1958), with Alice Phelan Sul-
livan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399 (Ct. CI. 1967).
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and repayment considered together will give rise to no gain. If the
repayment does not take place, however, the receipt is what is being
taxed and that receipt took place during the decedent's lifetime.
Revenue Ruling 78-292 1- presents an interesting contrast. There,
the decedent's estate received reimbursement for medical expenses paid
by the decedent. These expenses had been deducted on the decedent's
return and, although reimbursement was due to the decedent under the
policy, the decedent died before receiving the proceeds. The ruling
held that the amount of the reimbursement should be included to the
estate as income in respect of the decedent under section 691. This
ruling seems proper, since it was the estate, and not the decedent, that
received reimbursement. The decedent, to be sure, received a tax benefit
in the form of a lifetime deduction, which offset income, but to be
entitled to that deduction, of course, the decedent had to make an actual
expenditure. Although our hypothetical case, like Revenue Ruling
78-292, also involves the principle of tax benefit, in our case it is the
decedent who received a benefit, by way of an exclusion from income,
without ever having made an expenditure. The estate received no benefit
in the form of either an exclusion or a deduction.
Example 7: The facts are the same as in example 6 except that A
leaves at his death Blackacre, encumbered by the $80,000 mortgage,
and also $80,000 of cash. At first blush, this example seems identical
with example 4 where A, during his lifetime, transferred the mort-
gaged property plus $80,000 of cash to B, since in both cases A has
passed both the liability and the proceeds of the liability. In the lifetime
example 4, however, A transferred both the mortgaged property and the
cash proceeds to the same person. Thus, in example 4, the transaction
could be recast as a transfer by A to B of Blackacro, which had a value
of $180,000, was subject to a mortgage of $80,000 and had a basis of
$80,000 to A. We saw also that the transaction was the economic
equivalent of A paying off the mortgage with $80,000 of cash, then
transferring Blackacre unencumbered to B who thereafter himself bor-
rowed $80,000 giving back a mortgage on the property.
(1) Assume A's will leaves both Blackacre and the cash to B. If, in
the death transfer example we are now considering, A's will leaves
Blackacre and the $80,000 of cash specifically to B, i.e., to one bene-
ficiary, we would then have a case identical with example 4. As in the
lifetime transfer in example 4, A has passed on the liability to B, but he
has also disgorged the fruits of the mortgage to the same person, there-
fore, there is no past gain to A which should be subject to a deferred tax.
47 1978-2 C.B. 233.
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The practical effect of A shifting the liability to B together with the
money with which to pay the debt is that A has transferred Blackacre
unencumbered and B has borrowed the $80,000 himself.4"
Again using the part sale-part gift mechanism:
A's amount realized $80,000 (mortgage)
A's basis offset $80,000 (cash)
A's gain 0
The basis to B is:
$ 80,000 ("cost" under section 1012)




0 (carryover under section 1023 (a))
$ 80,000 (total which is allocated to the cash so that
Blackacre has a basis of zero)
Where section 1014 is the basis provision which operates on property
acquired from a decedent, the resulting step-up in basis for the unen-
cumbered portion ($100,000) of the total property passing at death
($180,000) has the effect of wiping out the unrealized appreciation in
Blackacre. Thus, section 1014 would supply to B a basis of $100,000
and section 1012 would supply a cost basis of $80,000 due to the mort-
gage on Blackacre. B would have an overall basis of S180,000, $80,000
in the cash and $100,000 in Blackacre. Note again that this is the same
result which would occur if the transaction took the form of A paying off
the mortgage and then dying with Blackacre unencumbered, and no
cash. Section 1014 would give a basis of $100,000 to Blackacre and
B could borrow $80,000, give back a mortgage on Blackacre and have
total assets of $180,000, basis of $180,000, which assets would be
burdened by an $80,000 mortgage. Thus, due to the application of
section 1014, the unrealized appreciation of $100,000 in Blackacre is
wiped out whether the loan proceeds are obtained by A while alive and
passed on to B at A's death, or there is no loan during A's life, but B
incurs the loan after A's death.
48 This alternative view of the transaction would leave any potential depreciation
recapture gain intact if section 1014(c) prevented step up due to such gain being
a section 691 item under the partnership provisions discussed in N. 43 supra. Our
main view of the transaction, however, would eliminate up to $80,000 of such
gain because of the presence of $80,000 of cost in Blackacre to the transferee.
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Where section 1023 is the operative basis at death provision, and
assuming there are no adjustments to basis, B will have a carryover basis
of zero and an overall basis of $80,000 supplied solely by section 1012
as cost due to the presence of the mortgage, with the cost being allocated
entirely to the cash. Again, these results accord entirely with our alterna-
tive view of the transaction-A dying with only Blackacre, unencum-
bered, and B borrowing $80,000 and giving the mortgage. Under either
view, B has a basis of zero in Blackacre and $80,000 in the cash. The
potential for $80,000 of gain to be recognized on a disposition of Black-
acre now remains with B, the transferee, as it did in the lifetime transfer
in example 4.
(2) Assume A's will leaves Blackacre to B and the cash to C.
(a) The effect of such a transfer by A during life. Note that if A
during his lifetime had transferred outright the mortgaged property to
B and the $80,000 cash to C, it is clear that A would be taxed on
$80,000 (the mortgage on Blackacre) under Crane and Johnson. In
such a case, A's transfer of $80,000 cash to C is the same as his reten-
tion or previous consumption of the cash. B takes subject to the mort-
gage and his cost basis of $80,000 prevents B from recognizing the
$80,000 of gain. If A doesn't recognize the gain, it will escape al-
together.
(b) The effect of a lifetime transfer to a trust for B and C. Note
that a different result would probably occur if A made the lifetime
transfer to B and C via a trust, i.e., if A transferred the mortgaged prop-
erty plus the $80,000 cash to T as trustee and directed the trust to trans-
fer the mortgaged property to B and the cash to C. The immediate reac-
tion to such a hypothetical would probably be that the interposition of a
trust should not change the situation since the trustee is merely being
used to pass title to B and C, and doctrines such as step-transaction and
business purpose would be invoked to tax A. But this misses the point
that the issue in such a case is really one of assignment of income. If A
is not taxed, the gain will be taxed to the trust; it will not escape as it
would if A were not taxed where A transferred Blackacre to B and the
cash to C without a trust.
Of course, seeing the issue as one of assignment of income does not
solve it. It does, however, make relevant the notion that Congress has
seen fit to treat a trust as an entity separate from the grantor (where the
grantor trust provisions do not apply) and thus has sanctioned the trust
as an income splitting device. If, for example, a taxpayer, G, desires
personally to accumulate income from property and give it to a relative,
S, at a later time (say, after 15 years), the income would be taxed to G
while it was being accumulated. But if G transferred the property to a
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trust and directed the trustee to accumulate the income for 15 years, and
then pay it to S, the income would be taxed to the trust and not to G.
The point is that the congressional recognition of a trust as a separate
taxable entity permits assignment of income, even though that may be
the only purpose of the arrangement and even though the grantor, solely
for tax purposes, is doing in two steps what he could have done in one.
The question is whether conveyance of Blackacre subject to a mortgage,
with directions to distribute Blackacre to B and the $80,000 cash to C,
will allow A to shift the tax on the gain arising from his past borrowing.
Turning to our alternate view of the transaction, the issue appears to be
the same as would arise if A transferred Blackacre to a trust, unencum-
bered,'and directed the trustee to borrow $80,000 cash, convey Black-
acre to B (subject to the mortgage) and the cash to C. Absent applica-
tion of any grantor trust provision,40 could A shift the tax arising from
the borrowing to the trustee? The same issue would also appear to arise
if A directed the trustee to sell Blackacre (which is unencumbered) and
pay the proceeds $20,000 to B and $80,000 to C. Would the realized
gain be that of A or of the trust? In these situations, we suggest that A
should be allowed to shift the tax to the trust."' Essentially, these situa-
tions are not different from one where A transfers Blackacre to a trust
and directs the trustee to rent Blackacre, accumulate the income for 15
49 If, for example, A retained a power of revocation, section 676 would apply
and A, not the trust, would be taxed on any gain.
5o Section 644 of the Code, enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976,
lends support to this proposition. That section provides that on any sale by a
trust within two years of the initial transfer of the property in trust, the trust is
taxed albeit, as though the grantor sold the property, i.e., at the grantor's rates.
This section presupposes that the grantor himself is not taxed unless the grantor
trust provisions apply.
On the other hand, Revenue Ruling 60-370, 1960-2 C.B. 203, holds that where
a trustee is under an express or implied obligation to sell the property transferred
in trust, "the transferor [grantor] realizes gain, includible in his gross income in
the taxable year of the sale or exchange." That ruling, however, should be dis-
tinguished since it did not involve an attempt to shift the tax to a trustee but rather
an attempt by the grantor to receive and retain the gain (or a substantial part of
it) but without any tax. Under the scheme (the so-called "Pomona Plan"),
the grantor retained the life income and the trustee, a charity, was required to sell
the property and acquire tax-exempt securities. There was also a secondary life
beneficiary who also was to receive tax-exempt income; thus, the grantor was at-
tempting to transform capital gain through a tax-exempt organization into tax-
exempt income to be received by himself and his secondary beneficiary. In such
a context, the step transaction and business purpose doctrines support the ruling's
result of taxing the grantor on the gain realized by the trust. In our situation, how-
ever, the trust is not being used to transmute taxable income into nontaxable in-
come retained by the grantor (a function not intended for the trust by Congress),
but to shift income to another taxpayer, a role that a trust traditionally has been
permitted to play.
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years and then pay it to B. This is common and accepted practice, and
it is clear that the trust pays the tax on the rents, not A. This is so despite
the fact that A's direction to the trustee to lease is the same as a direc-
tion to sell, since all leases are, pro tanto, sales of interests in the
"leased" property.
Since, under the assignment of income principles, a direction to sell,
lease or borrow, and to pay the proceeds to a beneficiary, would not
prevent A from shifting the tax on the gain realized, it should follow
that A could shift the tax where A does the borrowing himself prior to
the transfer to the trust directing conveyance of Blackacre to B and
the cash to C. Economically, this transaction does not differ in substance
from a conveyance of Blackacre unencumbered, and a direction for the
trustee to borrow and so distribute.
(c) The effect of such a transfer by will. In terms of a transfer effected
by death, the above analysis would result in treating a sale by the estate
pursuant to a decedent's directions as a taxable event to the estate and
not the decedent.51 The transfer of mortgaged property together with
the proceeds of the mortgage with directions to distribute the property
to B and the proceeds to C is the equivalent of transferring unencum-
bered property to an estate with directions to sell it and pay $20,000 of
the proceeds to B and $80,000 to C. In net sum, a decedent should not
be taxed whenever he dies with mortgaged property as long as he also
owns (and thus also transfers) property with a basis sufficient to offset
the amount of the mortgage.
This, of course, is precisely the approach taken by the regulations for
a lifetime part gift-part sale under section 1001. It is true that the regu-
lations speak of a part gift-part sale of a single piece of property, whereas
typically at death we have an aggregate of assets and liabilities. As we
have stated previously, however, where, e.g., Blackacre (value $100,-
000, mortgage $80,000, basis zero) is transferred simultaneously with
$80,000 of cash, there is no reason to treat the transferor as having done
anything other than transfer Blackacre (value $180,000, mortgage
$80,000, basis $80,000).
From the estate's point of view, if the estate receives Blackacre (value
$100,000, mortgage $80,000, basis zero) plus $80,000 of cash its basis
51 Where a will has directed an executor to sell property and distribute the pro-
ceeds, no attempt is made to tax the decedent. The question has arisen whether
the estate or the beneficiaries should be taxed on the gain from the sale, but since
the cases arose under section 1014, the gain involved was post-death appreciation
and not the pre-death appreciation we deal with here. See, e.g., Commissioner V.
Brinckerhoff, 168 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1948), holding that such gain is taxed to the
estate. For the view that the gain in such a case should be taxed to the beneficiary,
see Del Cotto at 237-38.
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in the aggregate will be $180,000 under sections 1012 and 1014 or
$80,000 under sections 1012 and 1023.12 Thus, the pre-death apprecia-
tion in Blackacre will be wiped out if the sections 1012 and 1014 com-
bination is operative, but not if sections 1012 and 1023 are operative.
As we shall see, in the latter situation the pre-death gain may be recog-
nized by either the estate or the beneficiaries.
Post-Death Transfers (Distributions
From Estate to Beneficiary)
The examples we use here are numbered 5(A), 6(A) and 7(A) to
correlate with examples 5, 6 and 7. In analyzing these examples, we will
assume, for the present, that there is no distributable net income of the
estate applicable to the distribution.
Unencun. 7ered Property
Example 5(A): In example 5, A dies owing Blackacre unencum-
bered, with a basis to A of zero and a fair market value of $100,000.
As we saw, on A's death,
(1) No gain is recognized to A, or his estate; and
(2) The basis of the estate in Blackacre becomes $100,000 under
section 1014 and zero under section 1023 (disregarding adjustments).
Distribution to a Specific or Residuary Devisee. When the estate dis-
tributes Blackacre in kind to a specific or residuary devisee, neither the
estate nor the beneficiary will have engaged in a sale.51 Thus, the estate
will not realize any gain on the distribution and the beneficiary will step
into the estate's shoes and will have a section 1014 basis of $100,000 or
a section 1023 basis of zero.5
4
Distributions in Satisfaction of a Fixed Dollar Amount. When the
estate distributes Blackacre in satisfaction of a fixed pecuniary amount
52 These basic results to the estate are also consistent with the part gift-part sale
regulations under section 1015. Those regulations state that a transferee's basis is
the higher of his cost or the transferor's basis. Thus, they would have the same
result as we have proposed where sections 1012 and 1023 operate. The regula-
tions, however, were written only for lifetime situations, since carryover basis
operates in such a case under section 1015. They simply do not speak to death
transfers where sections 1012 and 1014 operate because the principle of section
1014 is not carryover basis, but value at death.
-5 Rev. Rul. 55-117, 1955-1 C.B. 233; O.D. 667, 3 C.B. 52 (1920); Reg. §
1.1014-4(a) (2).
54 Any section 1023 adjustments will have the same effect, pro tanto, as a sec-
tion 1014 step up to fair market value.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
19791
TAX LAW REVIEW
($100,000), the distribution constitutes a sale by the estate and a pur-
chase by the beneficiary, with the following results:
Under Section 1014. Since the estate's basis is $100,000 under sec-
tion 1014, no gain would be realized. The beneficiary has a basis in his
claim equal to the amount of the claim, since that is its fair market value
at death. Thus, the beneficiary of a $100,000 legacy who receives Black-
acre, worth $100,000, in satisfaction of that legacy, has no gain and
his basis in Blackacre would now be his cost under section 1012, i.e.,
$100,000.
Under Section 1023. If the estate's basis is zero under section 1023,
$100,000 of gain would be realized to the estate. However, section 1040
(a), enacted at the same time as section 1023, provides that if the execu-
tor of an estate satisfies a pecuniary bequest with carryover basis prop-
erty the realized gain of the estate shall be recognized only to the extent
of post-death appreciation. Thus, in our case, none of the $100,000
realized gain would be recognized.
Section 1040(c) speaks to the situation of the beneficiary, provid-
ing that the basis of the beneficiary shall be carried over from the
estate but increased by any gain recognized by the estate. The basis of
the beneficiary here would be zero since no gain was recognized by the
estate. Thus, under the specific provisions of sections 1040 (a) and (c),
the pre-death appreciation in unencumbered property which is used to
satisfy a pecuniary legacy is not taxed to the estate but is carried over
to the legatee. The implication, of course, is that the legatee will not be
taxed at the time he receives the property in satisfaction of his legacy, but
rather only upon a taxable disposition of the property itself.
Encumbered Property
The transfer of mortgaged property without accompanying transfer of
other property with basis offset.
Example 6(A): In example 6, A, prior to his death, had borrowed
$80,000 and given back a mortgage on Blackacre. When he died, only
Blackacre, encumbered by the $80,000 mortgage, was in A's estate.
Under our analysis, the results at A's death were:
(1) A recognized $80,000 of gain which should be reported on A's
final return.
(2) The estate's basis in Blackacre became $100,000 under sec-
tions 1012 and 1014 or $80,000 under sections 1012 and 1023.
Let us now examine the effect of a distribution of Blackacre in such a
case, under the same variations which we discussed in example 5 (A).
Distribution to a Specific or Residuary Devisee. The transfer by the
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estate and receipt by the beneficiary in this situation should be viewed
as a bifurcated event. To the extent of the mortgage of $80,000, the
estate has sold the property and the beneficiary has purchased it. To
the extent of the equity, here $20,000, there has been a nonsale dis-
tribution.
Results Under Sections 1012 and 1014. Where the estate's basis has
been determined to be $100,000 under sections 1012 and 1014, the
estate will recognize no gain or loss since its amount realized on the sale
(the $80,000 mortgage) will be offset by a properly allocable basis
of $80,000.
The beneficiary will have a basis of $100,000 in Blackacre, $80,000
derived from section 1012 and $20,000 derived from section 1014 as
the fair market value of property (equity) acquired from the dece-
dent.
Results Under Sections 1012 and 1023. The estate should also be
treated as having no gain or loss where the estate's basis is determined
to be $80,000 under sections 1012 and 1023. In this situation, it could
be argued that only 80 percent of the basis of $80,000 ($64,000) should
be allocated to the sale, which would give rise to a gain of $14,000.
Such a result, however, would be inconsistent with the part gift-part sale
regulations for lifetime transfers, which allow a full basis offset. More-
over, it would ignore the fact that any gain in this situation would be
derived only by considering the mortgage an amount realized, and all of
such gain has already been recognized by the decedent. Taxing $14,000
of gain here to the estate would thus be taxing $14,000 of the unrealized
appreciation which inheres in the $20,000 of equity.
In this section 1012 and 1023 situation, the beneficiary's basis will
be $80,000, being totally derived from section 1012 since there is a zero
basis carryover in the equity under section 1023. There is thus preserved
in the beneficiary's hands the potential for the recognition of the $20,000
of unrealized pre-death appreciation which was not recognized by the
decedent on his final return.
Distribution in Satisfaction of a Fixed Dollar Amount. The assump-
tion here is that the specific dollar amount legacy, in satisfaction of
which Blackacre is distributed, is $20,000. This is because the equity in
Blackacre is only $20,000 and is thus the only amount for which Black-
acre could be distributed to a specific dollar legatee. What we have,
then, is really a dual sale. To the extent of the mortgage of $80,000, the
estate has engaged in a sale, but without regard to the satisfaction of any
specific dollar legacy. To the extent of the equity of $20,000, there has
also been a sale since that equity has been distributed in satisfaction of
a specific dollar legacy. The beneficiary of the $20,000 legacy has pur-
chased all of Blackacre, partly ($80,000) by taking subject to the $80,-
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000 mortgage and partly ($20,000) by exchanging his $20,000 claim
for the $20,000 equity in the property.
Results Under Sections 1012 and 1014. The estate has no gain or
loss realized because its basis of $100,000 fully offsets the $100,000
amount realized ($80,000 realized because of the mortgage, $20,000
realized from the satisfaction of the $20,000 legacy).
The beneficiary has exchanged his $20,000 claim for the $20,000
equity in the property. This exchange, however, gives rise to no inclu-
sion in the beneficiary's income, since the beneficiary exchanged a claim
with a basis under section 1014 of $20,000 in return for an equity worth
$20,000. The beneficiary's basis in Blackacre will be $100,000, totally
derived from section 1012. Again, $80,000 of the $100,000 will be
due to Crane principles giving $80,000 of cost because of the mortgage.
The other $20,000 is exchange cost since the beneficiary has exchanged
his claim for $20,000 (in which he had a section 1014 basis of $20,000)
for a fair market value of $20,000 (the equity in Blackacre).55
Results Under Sections 1012 and 1023. Since the estate has a zero
basis in the equity which it uses to satisfy the $20,000 legacy, the
estate has realized $20,000 of gain. Since, however, this gain is not due
to post-death appreciation, it is given nonrecognition treatment to the
estate under the policy of section 1040.
The beneficiary of the $20,000 legacy, who receives Blackacre in a
section 1012 and 1023 situation, will have a basis of $80,000, solely
derived from section 1012 due to the mortgage. Although the bene-
ficiary has engaged in an exchange of his $20,000 claim for the $20,000
of equity, he acquires no exchange cost basis thereby, because of the
specific provisions of section 1040(c), requiring that a beneficiary of a
pecuniary legacy take as a basis in the property distributed in satisfac-
tion thereof the basis of the estate plus any gain recognized to the estate
as a result of the distribution. Again, the clear implication of section
1040(c) is that the receipt by the beneficiary of the equity in satisfac-
tion of his $20,000 claim gives rise to no includable income to the
beneficiary.
Summary of Example 6(A). As appears from the analysis imme-
diately above, combined with our previous analysis of example 6:
(1) Regardless of whether sections 1012 and 1014 or sections 1012
and 1023 apply to the estate and beneficiary, the decedent's personal
representative must report $80,000 of gain on decedent's final return.
In this manner, $80,000 of the $100,000 gain inherent in Blackacre is
considered to be realized because of nonpayment of the mortgage.
55 See Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184
(Ct. C1. 1954).
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(2) Where sections 1012 and 1014 apply to the estate and bene-
ficiary, the remaining $20,000 of that gain escapes because of the policy
of section 1014.
(3) Where sections 1012 and 1023 apply, this remaining gain does
not escape, but continues to be deferred under the policy of sections
1023 and 1040 through the estate into the hands of the beneficiary. This
is so even where the estate satisfies a fixed dollar legacy because of the
policy of section 1040.
Encumbered Property
The transfer of mortgaged property accompanied by a transfer of
additional property with sufficient basis to offset the mortgage.
Example 7(A): In example 7, the decedent, A, prior to his death,
had borrowed $80,000 and given back a mortgage on Blackacre. When
he died, his estate included Blackacre, encumbered by the $80,000
mortgage, plus $80,000 of cash. Our conclusion was that A had no
gain at his death and that the basis of his estate in Blackacre would be
$100,000 under section 1014, but would be zero under section 1023.
Distribution to a Specific or Residuary Devisee. Results Under Sec-
tions 1012 and 1014. Since the estate has a basis of $100,000 in Black-
acre, where sections 1012 and 1014 apply the results to both the estate
and the devisees of a specific or residuary devise will be the same as they
were in example 6 (A), i.e., the estate will have no gain and the bene-
ficiary will have a basis of $100,000. This is true even though the de-
cedent, A, did not recognize gain on his final return since where A's
estate also includes $80,000 of cash, the situation is the same as if A
paid off the mortgage and transferred Blackacre unencumbered, with a
basis of zero and a fair market value of $100,000, in'which case the
basis of Blackacre steps up to $100,000.
Results Under Sections 1012 and 1023. Where section 1023 applies,
the basis of the estate in Blackacre is zero because the unrealized appre-
ciation is carried over to the estate under the policy of section 1023. If,
therefore, the estate distributes Blackacre to any beneficiary, including
a specific or residuary devisee, the mortgage will be an amount realized
of $80,000 to the estate and the estate will be required to recognize
$80,000 of gain on the transfer unless the executor also transfers to such
beneficiary, under the mandate or permission of the decedent, addi-
tional property with basis sufficient to offset the mortgage. If, for ex-
ample, A's will left all of his property to B, a transfer of Blackacre and
the $80,000 of cash to B would result in no gain to the estate. In such a
case B would step into the shoes of the estate and would have a basis of
zero in Blackacre and $80,000 in the cash.
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If, on the other hand, A's will left Blackacre to B and the residue of
his estate to C, the transfer of Blackacre to B would result in $80,000 of
gain to the estate under Crane and Johnson and B's basis in Blackacre
would be a cost basis of $80,000 and a zero carryover in the equity, for a
total of $80,000. There would be a similar result if A's will required
that the executor distribute $80,000 of cash to B and the rest of his
estate to C. Gain of $80,000 would again result to the estate on the
transfer of Blackacre to C under the residuary clause and C would have
a cost basis of $80,000.
Suppose A's will leaves 80 percent of his estate to B and 20 percent
of his estate to C and permits the executor, in his discretion, to deter-
mine which assets shall be distributed to B and which to C. If, in such a
case, the executor distributed Blackacre to C and $80,000 of cash to
B, the estate would be required to recognize $80,000 of gain, and C
would have a basis of $80,000 in Blackacre. If, on the other hand, the
executor distributed $20,000 of cash to C and $60,000 of cash plus
Blackacre to B, the estate would be required to recognize only $20,000
of the gain, and B's basis in Blackacre would be $20,000 (his basis in the
cash being $60,000), leaving B with the $60,000 of gain potential in
Blackacre which is as yet unrecognized.
Distribution in Satisfaction of a Fixed Dollar Amount. Suppose that
A's will left a fixed dollar legacy of $20,000 to B and the residue of his
estate to C, and permitted the executor to satisfy the dollar legacy in
cash or in kind. If the executor distributed Blackacre in satisfaction of
the fixed dollar legacy, we would again have (as in example 6(A)) a
dual sale. To the extent of the mortgage of $80,000, the estate has
engaged in a sale, but without regard to the satisfaction of any specific
dollar legacy. To the extent of the equity of $20,000, there has also
been a sale, since that equity has been distributed in satisfaction of a
specific dollar legacy.
Results Under Sections 1012 and 1014. The step-up of section 1014
would prevent the estate from recognizing gain on either sale, and B's
basis in Blackacre would be $100,000.
Results Under Sections 1012 and 1023. If we assume that the exec-
utor did not transfer additional property to B, the estate would realize
$100,000 of gain, $80,000 under Crane (since the mortgage would be
an amount realized and there would be no offsetting basis) and $20,000
because of the transfer of the equity in Blackacre in satisfaction of the
legacy of $20,000. Because of the policy of section 1040, however, the
estate would recognize only $80,000 of the $100,000 gain, i.e., the gain
attributable to the mortgage; not the gain arising from transfer of the
equity in discharge of the pecuniary bequest since that is within section
1040(a). B would have a basis of $80,000 in the property, derived
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solely from section 1012, since B took subject to the mortgage of $80,-
000; under section 1040(c), B would have a carryover basis of zero in
the equity.
Summary of Example 7(A). Where a decedent transfers at death
property encumbered by a mortgage and also property with a basis suffi-
cient to offset the amount of the mortgage, the decedent should be treated
as though he paid off the mortgage and transferred the property unen-
cumbered. The estate, in turn, should be treated as having received the
property unencumbered and then to have encumbered it. In such a case,
if section 1014, rather than section 1023, applies to property acquired
from a decedent, the unrealized appreciation in the encumbered property
will escape taxation, and the estate and beneficiaries will have a basis of
$100,000 in the property.
If section 1023 is applicable, however, the estate is in the same posi-
tion as the decedent immediately before his death. Thus, if the estate
disposes of the property without paying off the mortgage, or without
passing on to the transferee of the mortgaged property additional prop-
erty of sufficient basis to offset the mortgage, the estate will be required to
recognize gain under Crane. If the estate, on the other hand, passes on
additional property with basis sufficient to offset the mortgage, the bene-
ficiary then will step into the estate's shoes and will take the mortgaged
property with a basis of zero, and the potential gain will continue in the
beneficiary's hands.
Effect of State Law
Our analysis of death transfers and post-death transfers has proceeded
on the assumption that the property of a decedent passes from the de-
cedent to his estate, and then from his estate to the beneficiaries of his
estate, by way of distribution. Under the laws of some states, however,
it is said that title to property of a decedent passes directly from the de-
cedent to the decedents beneficiaries." For certain portions of our anal-
ysis, this concept of state law would have negligible effect. For example,
where the decedent dies with encumbered property, and there is insuffi-
cient basis in the encumbered property and his other property to offset
the amount of the encumbrance (example 6), our analysis indicates that
the decedent should recognize the gain on his final return. Thus, the gain
cannot be shifted to the estate beneficiaries. There is, thus, no reason to
5 G This notion is normally applicable to real property (Arrott v. Heiner, 92 F.2d
773 (3d Cir. 1937) (Pennsylvania law) ), although in some states it is applied to
personalty as well (Jones v. Whittington, 194 F.2d 812 (10th Cir. 1952) (Texas
law) ).
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determine whether the property bypasses the estate and passes directly
to the beneficiaries.
On the other hand, where the decedent dies with encumbered prop-
erty and there is sufficient basis in the encumbered and other prop-
erty to offset the amount of the encumbrance, our analysis indicates that
the decedent should not be taxed on his final return, because he is essen-
tially in the same position as if he paid off the mortgage and transferred
the property unencumbered. In such a case, moreover, if section 1014
is the operative basis section regarding property acquired from a de-
cedent, any gain inherent in the difference between the value and the
basis of the encumbered property will be wiped away. If section 1023
operates, however, there is still the potential for recognition of this gain,
and it is at this point that the concept of the estate as a separate taxpayer
becomes crucial. Suppose that a decedent who dies owning property
with basis sufficient to offset the amount of debt on encumbered prop-
erty has directed that the encumbered property be distributed to one
beneficiary, but has not also directed that that property with sufficient
basis offset be distributed to the same beneficiary. In such a case, if
the decedent is not to recognize gain on his final return, any gain inherent
in the encumbered property must be recognized by the estate or else it
will escape altogether, contrary to section 1023. Put another way, the
question is whether this situation should be treated as though during
lifetime an owner transferred encumbered property to one transferee and
other property to another transferee, in which case the transferor is re-
quired to recognize the gain in the encumbered property under Crane
and Johnson, or whether the situation should be rather treated as though
the transferor made the transfer to the separate transferee by way of a
trust, in which case, under our prior analysis the gain would be recog-
nized by the trust, but not by the transferor. The, problem is that if, for
tax purposes, the decedent's property is considered to pass at death di-
rectly to the beneficiaries, the decedent will not be able to use the death
counterpart of the lifetime trust, i.e., the estate, as a separate entity to
which to shift the tax. In such a case, the only alternative to allowing
the gain to escape altogether would be to require the decedent to recog-
nize the gain on his final return, just as a lifetime transferor would be re-
quired to recognize the gain at the time of the transfer. In both situa-
tions, the ultimate transferee of the encumbered property will not be
required to recognize the gain because he takes a cost basis equal to the
amount of the encumbrance."7
57 If the ultimate beneficiary receives both the encumbered property and prop-
erty (including the encumbered property) with basis sufficient to offset the en-
cumbrance, as our analysis indicates, it would be unnecessary and improper to tax
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
[Vol. 34:TAX LAW REVIEW
What then should be the relevance of the state law property concept
that certain property passes directly from the decedent to the decedent's
beneficiaries? This concept of state law has already been the subject of
sporadic litigation in the federal tax area and, although the cases and
rulings are not entirely clear, the rule that seems to have emerged is:
If the income, including capital gains, of the property, is subject to
administration, or more accurately, subject to the payment of claims
against the estate and expenses of the estate, such income, during the
normal period of administration, is income of the estate even if under
state law title to the property vests immediately in the intestate dis-
tributees or testamentary beneficiaries.: s
Given this rule, there would seem to be no reason why we should not
analyze the problem as we have, that is, by treating the property of the
decedent as passing from the decedent to his estate and from the estate
to his beneficiaries. The transfer of encumbered property is a sale under
Crane and should not be differentiated from any other sale for the pur-
poses of considering the estate as a separate entity which is required to
report gains on the sale of property during the period of administration.
Were this not the case, moreover, the decedent could easily make it the
case merely by transferring the title to all of his property to his personal
representative, in which case, despite any state law concept that property
passes immediately from the decedent to his beneficiaries, the personal
representative would take title to the property and the form of the trans-
action would comport with our analysis.59
A question which would still remain, however, would be one of timing.
If, for tax purposes, we are going to consider property as passing from
the decedent to the estate of the decedent and then from the estate of the
decedent to the beneficiaries, when shall the title be considered to pass
from the estate to the beneficiaries in those states which, for state law
purposes, consider the title to pass immediately from the decedent to the
beneficiaries, thus bypassing the estate? The proper time, consistent
the decedent or the estate on the gain preserved by section 1023 since the trans-
action is essentially a transfer of unencumbered property to the beneficiary who
thereafter encumbers the property. Thus, the potential gain is deferred into the
beneficiary's hands and will not escape if not taxed to the decedent or his estate.
58SThe cases are reviewed in Jones v. Whittington, 194 F.2d 812 (10th Cir.
1952). See also FERGUSON, FREELAND & STEPHENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATIoN
OF ESTATES AND BENEFICUaUES 12-14 (1970). The limitation of the rule to the
normal period of administration arises from the possibility that an estate may be
open for state law purposes but closed for income tax purposes. Reg. § 1.641 (b)-
3 (a). If the tasks of administration are complete, a sale of property by named
executors may be attributed to estate beneficiaries (Arrott v. Heiner, 92 F.2d 773
(3d Cir. 1937)) or to a trust established by the decedent's will (Anderson v.
Wilson, 289 U.S. 20 (1933)).
r9 Anderson v. Wilson, 289 U.S. 20 (1933).
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with the rule that has emerged for taxing the recognized gains to the
estate during administration, would seem to be the time when the prop-
erty is no longer subject to administration. This principle has recently
been applied in connection with section 2032 of the Code where the
question has arisen whether property has been "distributed" prior to the
six month alternate valuation date, since, under that provision, if prop-
erty is "distributed, sold, exchanged, or otherwise disposed of" before
the six month period, it must be valued as of the date of "distribution,
sale, exchange, or other disposition." In Revenue Ruling 78-378 00 a
decedent died leaving all of his real property to A and all of his personal
property to B. Under the applicable state law, legal title to both real
and personal property passed immediately to the decedent's heirs,
legatees and devisees, subject to the right of the executor to use the
property to satisfy claims and expenses. The state law required the
executor to take possession of all personal property but with respect to
real property, the executor had no right of possession unless the realty
had to be sold to satisfy claims or unless it was necessary for the executor
to preserve the property for the devisees. The real property could be sold
before payment of all claims against the estate upon a finding that the
other assets would be sufficient to pay the claims. The ruling held that
although title and possession to the realty immediately passed to the
devisee, such passing did not constitute a distribution within the mean-
ing of section 2032 because the property was subject to the executor's
right of possession to satisfy claims until final settlement of the estate.
Transfer of full control was not effected "until the probate court entered
an order specifically releasing the realty from the executor's right of
possession, or until entry of a final order approving payment of all
claims." 01
Returning to the relevant variation of our basic example, and apply-
ing the above-outlined principles, if a decedent devised Blackacre (basis
zero, value $100,000, mortgage $80,000) to A and the rest of his estate
($80,000 cash) to B, there would be no gain recognized to the decedent.
On the decedent's death, the estate would have a basis of zero in Black-
acre and $80,000 in cash under sections 1012 and 1023 and, when
Blackacre was no longer subject to administration, the estate would rec-
ognize a gain of $80,000.. These would be the results even if the state
law considered title had passed directly to A and B.
00 1978-2 C.B. 229.
61 Id. at 54. Our analysis could also be applied to property that passes outside
of a decedent's probate estate, e.g., by way of a revocable inter vivos trust or even
as jointly held property since in some states such property is available for the pay-
ment of claims against the estate. See Matter of Granwell, 20 N.Y.2d 91, 228
N.E.2d 779 (1967). But cf. Rev. Rul. 78-431, 1978-2 C.B. 230.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
600 [Vol. 34:TAX LAW REVIEW
INHERITED TAX SHELTER
Planning Considerations
In our discussion, three taxpayers were identified: the decedent, his
estate and the decedent's beneficiary (or beneficiaries).
The decedent will be the taxpayer who recognizes gain on his final
return, when he does not have sufficient basis in the property transferred
at death to offset liabilities.12 If this is the situation at death, no post-
death actions can be taken to avoid recognition since death is the time
at which the taxable transfer takes place. For the same reason, no
amount of pre-death planning with respect to the at-death disposition
by will or will substitute (for instance, revocable trust, jointly held
property) of the decedent's encumbered or unencumbered property will
be of any avail since such planning cannot change the gain producing
excess of liabilities over basis at death. Indeed, the only real planning
available to prevent the decedent's recognition of gain is the pre-death
avoidance of the at-death excess of liabilities over basis. If we posit
such an excess at a point prior to death, this gain causing excess cannot
be avoided by transferring the property together with the related debt,
since that will be a lifetime taxable event.0 It can thus be avoided only
by acquiring sufficient offsetting basis, which is tantamount to saying
that it can be avoided only by paying off the debt. And this is as it
should be, since the rationale for gain, when it is required to be recog-
nized by the decedent, is the certainty that the debt from which the
decedent derived tax benefit will not be repaid by him.
On the other hand, where the decedent transfers at death property
with basis sufficient to offset liabilities, and he thus escapes tax himself
(properly), planning possibilities, both pre-death and post-death, are
present. First, however, it should be noted that in such a case, no plan-
ning is necessary to prevent gain recognition where section 1014 is the
basis section applicable to property acquired from a decedent, since all
gain inherent in the decedent's property, whether specifically encum-
bered or not, is wiped away by a step-up in basis to fair market value at
death.
It is thus only where section 1023 operates that planning is necessary
62 AIlthough all of our hypothetical cases have involved specific encumbrances,
the analysis which leads to recognition of gain by a decedent where specific en-
cumbrances exceed basis leads equally to such gain recognition where the liabilities
are general, e.g., personal debts of the decedent; for the principle involved calls
for a comparison at death between a taxpayer's aggregate basis and aggregate
liabilities.
63 Pre-death transfers of unencumbered property might leave the decedents
estate without property to pay the tax. Such transfers, however, in order to be
successful avoidance mechanisms would have to pass muster under transfer in
fraud of creditor doctrine.
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and possible, and essentially the planning is for continued deferral. The
policy of section 1023, like section 1015 during life, is to prevent the
escape of gain which existed in the property in the hands of the gratuitous
transferor and to carry it over into the hands of the transferee. Where
the property is unencumbered, that carryover and continued deferral is
accomplished merely by the transfer of the property-from decedent to
the decedent's estate, and from the decedent's estate to the beneficiary, or
beneficiaries. Where the property is specifically encumbered, however,
gain will be recognized to the estate upon distribution and deferral will
not continue, unless the beneficiary of the encumbered property also
receives property, including the encumbered property, with a sufficient
basis (to the estate) to offset the encumbrance. If, e.g., a decedent dies
owning (1) Blackacre (value $100,000, mortgage $80,000, basis zero),
(2) cash of $80,000 and (3) Whiteacre (value $80,000, basis zero),
mortgage zero) and the decedent's will leaves Blackacre and Whiteacre
to X and the residue to Y, the estate will recognize $80,000 of gain
when it distributes Blackacre and Whiteacre to X. But if the will had
left Blackacre and the cash to X and the residue to Y, the estate would
recognize no gain and the gain in Blackacre would be deferred into X's
hands. 4 Thus, by pre-death planning, basis can be directed to follow
liability and gain can be deferred indefinitely.6
If the match up of basis and liability is not directed in pre-death in-
struments, it may be permitted to the executor. Suppose, for example,
that the decedent's will in the above example gave an $80,000 legacy
to X, residue to Y and gave discretion to the executor with respect to the
assets used to satisfy legacies. If, in that situation, the executor distrib-
uted $80,000 of cash to X, the estate would be required to recognize
$80,000 of gain when the residue (Blackacre and Whiteacre) was dis-
tributed to Y. Such gain inherent in Blackacre could be avoided by the
executor and the deferral continued into Y's hands if the executor dis-
tributed Whiteacre to X and cash and Blackacre to Y.06
64 It bears repeating that this is tantamount to the estate satisfying the mortgage
debt with the cash and transferring Blackacre unencumbered. In such a case, the
gain in Blackacre is avoided by the estate and is deferred into the hands of the
beneficiary.
" Where the decedent does not recognize gain because his aggregate basis in
transferred property equals or exceeds the liabilities, if particular property is not
specifically encumbered but is subject to general encumbrances, such as personal
debts of the decedent, it will have the same basis to the transferee as unencum-
bered property. If, e.g., decedent died owning Blackacre, value $100,000, and
basis of $90,000 and subject to decedent's personal debt of $80,000, the decedent
would recognize no gain and the estate's basis would be $90,000 under sections
1012 and 1023 (higher of cost or carryover under the theory of section 1.1015-4
of the regulations).
66 The opportunity for post-death planning is not limited to situations involving
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Finally, even where basis and liability are misdirected in the decedent's
will and no discretion is left to the executor, recognition to the estate
can be avoided and deferral continued by the proper use of disclaimer.
Suppose, e.g., the decedent's will in our hypothetical left Blackacre
specifically to X and the residue to Y. If distribution were in accordance
with these will provisions, the estate would recognize gain of $80,000.
If, however, X disclaimed his devise of Blackacre, it would fall into the
residue and the distribution of all the property (Blackacre, Whiteacre
and $80,000 cash) to Y would prevent recognition by the estate and
continue deferral of the gain in Blackacre into Y's hands.
To repeat, however, all these planning possibilities in section 1023
situations are limited to avoiding gain to the estate and continuing de-
ferral. They are not designed to eliminate recognition of gain (except
to the extent that continued deferral approximates such elemination). Of
course tax on the gain could be eliminated if the encumbered property
and property with offsetting basis (including the encumbered property)
were distributed to a tax-exempt organization, just as the distribution
could eliminate tax on unencumbered property despite section 1023.
With respect to encumbered property, however, the elimination of tax
can only be accomplished by an accompanying disposition of property
(including the encumbered property) with sufficient offsetting basis.
Conclusion
The subject of this article has been the tax consequences to a dece-
dent, an estate and estate beneficiaries of the passage of encumbered
property at death. Our major concerns have been the questions of the
realization and recognition of gain to each of these separate tax entities
and the effect on such questions of varied circumstances, including the
decedent's estate plan and postmortem events. In light of these major
concerns, and in order to avoid undue complexities, we have determined
not to delineate the effect of the depreciation recapture provisions of the
Code, or of the presence of distributable net income in an estate. We
would only note that although these factors are undoubtedly important,
their application to the situations and transactions we have discussed do
not raise any major novel issues or affect our analysis and conclusions.
fixed amount legacies. If, for example, the decedent's will in our example left 4/9
(80/180) of his estate (value $80,000) to X and the residue to Y. the executor
is in the same position with respect to deferring the gain in Bhtckacre as he is
when the will leaves a cash legacy of $80,000 to X and the residue to Y. An ex-
ecutor with the proper discretion could satisfy X's fractional share with H'hiteacre
(value $80,000) and thereby avoid recognition of the gain in Blackacre.
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Illustrative examples for both depreciation recapture "I and distributable
net income 68 are noted below.
07 Take the situation in example 3: A owns Blackacre, value $100,000, basis
zero, encumbered by a mortgage of $80,000. On a transfer to B subject to the
mortgage, A's gain is $80,000. As we have seen, up to the amount of the en-
cumbrance there has been a sale. The gift exclusion of the recapture sections
(I.R.C. §§ 1245(b)(1), 1250(d)(1)) has no application except to the portion
of the transfer in which the transferee takes a section 1015 basis. Reg. §§ 1.1245-
4(a)(1), 1.1250-3(a)(1). Therefore, the gift exclusion applies only to the
$20,000 equity in the property transferred, and not to the encumbered portion.
So, the portion of the gain which is depreciation recapture under either section
1245(a)(1) or section 1250(a)(1) will be ordinary income. Reg. §§ 1.1245-
4(a)(3), (4), 1.1250-3(a) (2), (4) Ex. 1.
B, the transferee, takes the property with an $80,000 cost basis under section
1012, and a sections 1015(a) and (d) basis for the equity. To the extent B has
cost, the property is no longer subject to the recapture sections. Reg. §§ 1.1245-
2(c) (1), 1.1250-2(e) (1). B holds the equity value, however, subject to the re-
capture provisions in the amount not recaptured by A. Reg. §§ 1.1245-4(a) (4),
1.1250-3(a)(3), (4) Ex. 1.
Where the identical transfer is effected at A's death, as in example 6, the re-
sults for the decedent-transferor and the estate-transferee are similar to those for
example 3. There is a sale up to the amount of the encumbrance, which sale is
not within the transfer at death exception of sections 1245(b) (2) and 1250(d)
(2). Reg. §§ 1.1245-4(b) (1), 1.1250-3(b). Hence, any depreciation recapture
in the $80,000 gain is taxable as ordinary income on the decedent's final return.
The estate-transferee takes the property with an $80,000 cost basis under sec-
tion 1012, and a date of death basis for the equity. If section 1014 is the opera-
tive date of death provision, then any further recapture gain is eliminated by the
basis step up. If section 1023 is operative, then, by a parity of reasoning with
the example 3 discussion, the estate holds the property subject to recapture in the
amount not recaptured by the decedent. Although this result is not explicit in
the statute, the legislative history makes it clear that a section 1023 basis carries
with it depreciation recapture under sections 1245 and 1250. H.R. REP. No.
94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1976).
In examples 5(A), 6(A) and 7(A), when the estate distributes Blackacre, to
the extent there is gain arising from the presence of the mortgage, the recapture
provisions will apply in the usual manner. Thus, if Blackacre goes to the estate
unencumbered (example 5(A)), it is fully subject to the transfer at death excep-
tions of the recapture statutes, and the estate takes subject to full recapture when
it makes a disposition of the property in a taxable transfer. A transfer by the
estate to a specific legatee would not be such a transfer because of the property
keeping its date of death basis in the hands of the legatee. Reg. §§ 1.1245-
4(b)(1), 1.1250-3(b).
But, to the extent of any encumbrance (examples 6(A) and 7(A)), the prop-
erty would pass by sale and any gain to the estate would be subject to the re-
capture provisions to the extent the recapture was not taxed to the decedent.
Most important, any gain attributable to the value of the equity and which,
but for sections 1245 and 1250, is protected by section 1040 (i.e., gain arising
from satisfaction of a pecuniary bequest), would seem to lose such protection
when the estate transfers the property. There is full recapture of the section 1040
gain under the general provisions of sections 1245(a) and 1250(a) because Con-
gress has failed to extend the carryover basis exception of sections 1245(b) (3)
and 1250(d) (3) to the basis acquired by the estate's transferee under section
1040(c).
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08 Take one of the variations in example 7(A) assuming section 1023 rather
than section 1014 applies: A dies owning Blackacre, value S100,000, basis zero,
encumbered by a mortgage of $80,000. His estate also includes S80,000 of
cash. His will leaves all of his property to B. On A's death, he has no gain and
the basis of the estate in Blackacre under section 1023 would be zero.
Suppose now that the estate distributes Blackacre and the S80,000 cash to B
during a taxable year when it has distributable net income of S10,000. In such
a case the estate would have no gain on the distribution since its amount realized
($80,000 mortgage) is offset by the $80,000 cash. B, however, would have to
include $10,000 in his gross income under section 662 since the distribution of
the equity of $20,000 in Blackacre plus the $80,000 of cash carries out all of the
distributable net income of $10,000 to B. B's basis would then be derived from
three sources: $80,000 under Crane because of the mortgage on Blackacre,
$10,000 because of his inclusion of $10,000 distributable net income in his in-
come (Reg. § 1.662(a) (1) (f) ), and a zero carryover basis under section 1023
for A's zero basis in Blackacre. This total of S90,000 would then be allocated
$80,000 to the cash leaving B with $10,000 of basis in Blackacre.
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